

Indonesian Pro-IS supporters on social media in 2022: Surviving not thriving

Jordan Newton

Exploring Hindutva Online Subculture

Benjamin Mok

Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism and COVID-19 – A Two-Year Stock take

Raffaello Pantucci

An Analysis of *Bai`ah Al-Mawt* (Pledge of Death) in Jihadist Groups' Practice and Islamic Tradition

Muhammad Haniff Hassan



An Analysis of *Bai`ah Al-Mawt* (Pledge of Death) in Jihadist Groups' Practice and Islamic Tradition

Muhammad Haniff Hassan

This article examines the idea and practice of Bai`ah Al-Mawt (pledge of death) among contemporary jihadist groups through the lens of Islamic Sunni intellectual tradition and security studies. The article employs library research, examines materials of jihadist groups, analyses literature by researchers of security and other relevant studies, and factors in the works of classical and contemporary Sunni scholars. It concludes that Bai`ah Al-Mawt as a concept is not problematic at theological and security levels. Instead, the threat lies in the application and practice by jihadist groups of this pledge.

Introduction

Bai`ah is an Arabic word that translates to pledge in English. In the Islamic Sunni intellectual tradition, there are two types of *bai`ah*. The first is a *bai`ah* of allegiance and obedience to a Muslim caliph. This also functions as an individual's endorsement of a Muslim's appointment as a caliph. The second is a *bai`ah* of commitment to accomplish a certain religious mission or task, or to abstain from certain things on religious grounds.¹ *Bai`ah Al-Mawt* (pledge of death) as discussed in this article falls under the second type.

A great body of academic work exists on *bai`ah* as an Islamic tradition.² Similarly, there are also works on the topic as practised by jihadist groups from a security perspective.³ However, little research has been done on the practice of *Bai`ah Al-Mawt* by jihadist groups as a sub-set to *bai`ah* in Islam. This article seeks to fill that gap in the hope of catalysing a deeper look at it from various perspectives.

The article investigates the practice of *Bai`ah Al-Mawt* by jihadist groups through the lens of Islamic Sunni intellectual tradition as well as security. It begins with a brief description of *Bai`ah Al-Mawt* by jihadist groups and the arguments they put forth. It then looks into Islamic Sunni intellectual tradition for the purpose of comparing the idea and practice of *Bai`ah Al-Mawt* between the two. The choice to solely focus on Islamic Sunni intellectual tradition is due to the constraint of space and the author's lack of expertise in Shiite and other traditions. Finally, the article offers an analysis of *Bai`ah Al-Mawt* by jihadist groups – whether it is problematic (or not) from a theological and security perspective.

For the purposes of this article, jihadist groups refer to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) and their affiliates. It is worth noting that *Bai`ah Al-Mawt* is also practised by various contemporary jihadist groups; it is not exclusive to Al-Qaeda and IS.⁴ However, *Bai`ah Al-Mawt* is mainly relevant to the aforementioned two groups as they pose a serious threat to global security.

Jihadists' Viewpoint and Practice

Jihadist groups practise *bai`ah* firstly as a declaration of allegiance to an *Emir* (leader) upon joining the group under him. It is a form of initiation rite for a person who is accepted into or has agreed to join the group. Secondly, *bai`ah* is made for the execution of a specific mission or task. It is done when a person or group of persons is assigned or voluntarily opts to accomplish a mission or task, to show their commitment to others and to strengthen their resolve.

Bai'ah Al-Mawt, which falls under the second category, varies among groups, with a few commonalities. Firstly, it is done in the name of or dedicated to Allah. Secondly, it pertains to the intent to perform a mission or task. Thirdly, it is an explicit declaration of readiness to die for the mission or task. The extract below, taken from materials produced by militants, provides a clearer understanding of the *bai'ah*:

*"We pledge to Allah and we pledge to Muhammad, the Messenger of Allah, to perform jihad in the path of Allah, and to persevere in the path of Allah. We pledge till death to protect Muslims' dignity, support the oppressed and raise the flag of this religion. May God be the witness of what we have said."*⁵

Bai'ah Al-Mawt has been made for missions or tasks such as defending a territory or hometown,⁶ raiding the enemy⁷ and carrying out suicide bombings using vehicle- or human-borne improvised explosive devices.⁸ For instance, IS reported an *inghimasi* operation – “an individual or a small group immersing themselves within a large army of non-believers in search of martyrdom or causing damage to them”⁹ – in Iraq that was preceded by a pledge of death by seven operatives in the fourth issue of its monthly English-language magazine, *Rumiyah*.¹⁰

IS justifies the pledge by citing scriptural evidence and scholarly opinion, but holds the view that the pledge is neither obligatory nor a mandatory requirement for the accomplishment of a mission. However, once the pledge has been made, it becomes obligatory for the participant to fulfil it. Non-fulfilment of the pledge without valid reason is regarded as a grave sin.¹¹ The same stance and argument can also be found in Muhammad Abdul Salam's book *Al-Jihad: Al-Faridah Al-Gha'ibah (Jihad: The Absent Obligation)*.¹²

On its part, Al-Qaeda sought validation for the *bai'ah* from the Prophet's tradition known as *Bai'ah Al-Ridwan*, which refers to a pledge made by the Prophet and his companions in a place called Hudaibiyah. Then, the *bai'ah* was done to legitimise an *inghimasi* operation.¹³

***Bai'ah Al-Mawt* in Islamic Tradition**

Within the Islamic Sunni intellectual tradition, *Bai'ah Al-Mawt* is also known as *Bai'ah Al-Shajarah* (pledge of the tree), *Bai'ah Al-Ridwan* (pledge of divine pleasure), *Bai'ah Al-Sabr* (pledge of patience) and *Bai'ah Al-Jihad* (pledge of jihad).

Bai'ah Al-Mawt relates to an important event in the Prophet's history, the Treaty of Hudaibiyah (6H). The treaty was sealed by the Prophet and his Muslim companions with the Meccan Quraish and their pagan Arab allies to end hostilities for the duration of 10 years.¹⁴

The treaty was preceded by an *umrah* (minor pilgrimage) to Mecca made by the Prophet and 1,400 companions at a time when the city was controlled by the Quraish tribe, which was in conflict with the Prophet. From a campsite known as Hudaibiyah,¹⁵ the Prophet sent his senior companion, Uthman, to inform the Quraish about his intention to perform *umrah*, not to fight, and to negotiate the right of pilgrimage to Mecca. Uthman was held by the Quraish for a few days in Mecca, with his absence prompting speculation that he had been killed. An angered Prophet then called upon the other companions to perform a pledge with him to fight the Quraish in order to avenge Uthman's killing.

The pledge was recorded in Islamic history as *Bai'ah Al-Mawt* because it reportedly contained a commitment to fight till death, based on accounts by some of its participants.¹⁶ It was also named as *Bai'ah Al-Shajarah*¹⁷ because it was made under a tree as mentioned in the Qur'an;¹⁸ as *Bai'ah Al-Ridwan*¹⁹ to highlight its virtue in God's eye as recorded in the Qur'an; as *Bai'ah Al-Sabr* for pledging patience in facing adversity in avenging Uthman;²⁰ and as *Bai'ah Al-Jihad* for jihad against Quraish for killing Uthman.²¹

Sunni Muslim Scholars on *Bai`ah Al-Mawt*

Sunni Muslim scholars rule that a pledge of death is not obligatory and participation in it should be on a voluntary basis. However, fulfilment of the pledge becomes obligatory for those who choose to perform it.²² It should be noted that the term *Bai`ah Al-Mawt* and its underlying symbolism was contentious among the original participants. There are many hadiths (Prophetic traditions) that report that some participants disliked the *Bai`ah Al-Mawt* moniker. The most famous among them were Jabir bin Abdullah and Ma`qal bin Yasar; both were the Prophet's companions who participated in the *bai`ah*. They strongly denied that the pledge was to fight till death and stressed instead that it was a commitment to not retreat or return to Medina until Uthman's death was avenged or the mission to perform *umrah* was accomplished.²³ Another critical account can be found in a historical report from a later period, which states that a companion rejected a call to perform the pledge of death and announced that he would only make such a pledge to the Prophet.²⁴

The idea of a pledge of death became more acceptable among Muslim scholars after the generation of companions, when some of them sought to reconcile the "fight till death" and "no retreat or return until mission accomplished" accounts.²⁵

For instance, the renowned Muslim jurist and hadith commentator Imam Al-Nawawi asserted that the different accounts about the nature of the pledge were not contradictory and in fact, when taken collectively, provided holistic meaning to the pledge. Al-Nawawi argued that a pledge of no retreat is to steadfastly fight the enemy until victory is accomplished or they (Muslims) die for it, which encompasses the meanings in the pledge of death, of patience and of jihad.²⁶

However, the abovementioned reconciliation attempts are problematic because they sidestep the fact that there are numerous hadiths containing the companions' strong and explicit denial that the pledge is for death, such as:

"It has been narrated on the authority of Jabir who said: We were one thousand and four hundred on the Day of Hudaibiya. We swore fealty to him (the Prophet) and `Umar was holding the latter's hand (when he was sitting) under the tree (called) Samura (to administer the oath to the Companions). The narrator added: *We took oath to the effect that we would not flee (from the battlefield if there was an encounter with the Meccans), but we did not take oath to fight to death [emphasis added].*"²⁷

It is probable that the Prophet accepted different pledges from different individuals. Some pledged to fight, while others pledged to be patient in the face of adversity, and still others pledged to not retreat until the mission was accomplished, as reported in commentaries of the Qur'an.²⁸ This does not negate the fact that there were many who disliked or were uncomfortable with the pledge of death.

The dislike and discomfort continued among later generations of classical Muslim scholars, and into the contemporary era. This can be observed, for example, from the choice by classical Muslim scholars Al-Bukhari,²⁹ Muslim,³⁰ Al-Nasa'i³¹ and Al-Darimi³² to use a "pledge of no retreat" as the preferred title for a sub-chapter in their book of hadiths. Modern scholar Ali Al-Nadwi also reported the pledge as one of non-retreat in his book *Al-Sirah Al-Nabawiyah* (The History of the Prophet).³³ Another contemporary scholar, Al-Mubarakfuri, referred to it as *Bai`ah Al-Ridwan* in his award-winning book on the Prophet's history, *Al-Rahiq Al-Makhtum* (The Sealed Nectar), although he mentioned in passing that some companions had been willing to sacrifice their lives.³⁴

Assessment and Insights

Conceptually and theologically, *Bai`ah Al-Mawt* is not problematic from the standpoint of Islamic Sunni intellectual tradition. However, the jihadist application of this notion poses three significant problems.

First, when used for armed jihad, *Bai'ah Al-Mawt* in the Sunni tradition can only be employed by the right authority or by groups officially sanctioned by it. In contemporary times, the former refers to the government of an internationally recognised state, and the armed forces or militia groups officially affiliated to it.³⁵ Jihadist groups (as non-state actors) are neither the authority nor a legitimately affiliated group. This is especially so in the case of Al-Qaeda and IS and their affiliates.

Second, jihadist groups do not fulfil the “right cause” criterion for waging armed jihad in the Sunni tradition. They fight for rebellious reasons, causing strife and greater *dharar* (harm) to Islam and Muslims, and employ forbidden tactics such as terrorism and suicide bombings.

It must be highlighted that the “right cause” criterion for legitimate jihad applies to jihad declared by the right authority as well. However, a right authority may wage a wrongful war in the name of jihad, such as Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1992. This makes the use of *Bai'ah Al-Mawt* theologically invalid even if it is carried out by armed forces and militiae.

Thirdly, it is known that jihadist groups employ *Bai'ah Al-Mawt* in suicide operations. This is qualitatively different from the conventional understanding of what it means to “fight till death” and there being “no retreat/surrender”. The latter may involve high-risk or daring missions where death is probable but not certain and the combatants are killed by enemy fire; not by their own weapons or explosive devices, which characterise suicide operations by jihadist groups. The majority of contemporary Sunni scholars have ruled the suicide missions employed by jihadist groups as abhorred by Islam. Hence, the same ruling applies to *Bai'ah Al-Mawt* when used for such purposes.³⁶

From a security standpoint, *Bai'ah Al-Mawt* has its equivalent in military and security studies, and has been employed from ancient to modern times. History records with admiration various “fight till death” and “no retreat/surrender” incidents, such as the battle of Thermopylae where the Spartans fought till death against the superior Persian army. However, there remains an obvious security threat when the *Bai'ah Al-Mawt* is exploited by illegitimate armed groups like jihadist outfits to justify their illegitimate purposes and forbidden tactics.

Conclusion

The manipulation of *Bai'ah Al-Mawt* by jihadist groups facilitates a strict (albeit incorrect) theological validation for their violent activities. The *Bai'ah Al-Mawt* becomes a tool to consolidate jihadist power and control over followers and sympathisers by:

- providing supposed “Islamic legitimacy” that would garner Muslims’ support and endorsement;
- winning over members’ commitment in executing and performing critical missions or tasks; and
- facilitating control over members so they would not resent or resist when ordered to fight till death or carry out suicide missions.

However, when it comes to countering violent extremism (CVE), which often involves delegitimising jihadist ideology and narratives, caution is needed in order to avoid generalising *Bai'ah Al-Mawt* as a theologically abhorrent notion with absolutely no root in Islam. Such oversimplistic claims could potentially jeopardise the credibility of the highly nuanced counter-ideological work being done in the CVE space.

Rather, it may be more effective to counter jihadists’ manipulation of *Bai'ah Al-Mawt* by mainstreaming the refutation of the pledge of death by the revered first generation of Muslims, found in Islamic Sunni intellectual tradition. The companions’ robust repudiation of the *Bai'ah Al-Mawt* as a pledge of death

offers a potentially persuasive and religiously-grounded argument with which to debunk its misuse by jihadist groups.

About The Author:

Muhammad Haniff Hassan is a Fellow at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University of Singapore. He can be contacted at ismhaniff@ntu.edu.sg or www.haniff.sg/en.

Acknowledgement:

The author would like to thank Mustazah Bahari, former Associate Research Fellow at ICPVTR, for his significant assistance in researching the topic.

Citations

¹ PERGAS, *Moderation in Islam in the Context of Muslim Community in Singapore* (Singapore: Persatuan Ulama dan Guru-Guru Agama Islam Singapura, 2004), 300.

² Muhammad Yusuf Faruqi, "The Bay'ah as a Politico-Legal Principle: The Prophet (S.A.W), the Fuqaha' and the Rashidun Caliphs," *Intellectual Discourse*, 17, 1, 2009, 65-82; Ahmad Mahmud Al Mahmud, *Al-Bay'ah Fi Al-Islam: Tarikhuha Wa Aqsamuha Bayn Al-Nazariyah Wa Al-Tatbiq* (Bahrain: Dar al-Bayariq); Mawsu'ah Al-Tafsir Al-Maudu'iy Li Al-Qur'an Al-Karim, *Al-Bai'ah*, <https://modoe.com/show-book-scroll/305>.

³ PERGAS, *Moderation in Islam*, 297-301; Abdul Rahman ibn Mualaa al-Luwaihiq al-Mutairi, *Religious Extremism in the Lives of Contemporary Muslims*, translated by Jamaal al-Din Zarabozo (Denver: Al-Basheer Publications and Translations, 2001), 225-242; Carlos Igualada and Javier Yagüe, "The Use of Bay'ah by the Main Salafi-Jihadist Groups," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 15, No. 1, February 2021, 39-48; Philipp Holtmann, "Online and Offline Pledges of IS: Creating a Nexus of Authority," *RSIS Commentary*, December 2, 2014, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/CO14239.pdf>; Daniel Milton and Muhammad Al-'Ubaydi, "Pledging Bay'a: A Benefit or Burden to the Islamic State?" *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 8, No. 3, March 2015, <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/CTCSentinel-Vol8Issue319.pdf>, 1-7; Muhammad Saiful Alam Shah Bin Sudiman, "Islamic State (IS) Misconception of Bay'at: Nuances in Oath of Allegiance," *Countering Islamic State Ideology: Voices of Singapore Religious Scholars*, eds, Muhammad Haniff Hassan and Rohan Gunaratna (Singapore: PERGAS, 2021), 69-71.

⁴Abdillah Gorash, "Bai'ah Al-Mawt Al-Istiwaiyah – Al-Shaykh Al-Shahid Ja'far Banqa," *YouTube*, January 26, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y9b_BynvR_k; Muhammad Al' Abd Allah, "Bai'ah Al-Mawt Min Tilal Al-Kabinah Bi Rif Al-Lazaqiyah," *YouTube* video, August 28, 2019,

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=R8RvCuUvCMg>; Abu Yazn Al-Shami, "Quwwat Al-Mughawir Fi Harakat Ahrar Al-Sham Yubayi'un `Ala Al-Mawt `Ala Jabahat Rif Hamah," *YouTube*, August 16, 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xSZrcgGeCd0>; Wakalah Awqat Al-Sham Al-Akhbariyah, "Bai'ah Al-Mawt – Al-Julani Yazhar Bi `Asabah Al-Hamra' Li Awwal Marrah Ba'd Hazimah Quwwatih `Ala Jabahat Halb Wa Idlib," *Shaam News*, February 2, 2020, <https://shaamtimes.net/221543/-بائعة-الموت-الجولاني/>; <https://arabi21.com/story/954644/يظهر-بعصبة-حمر-اء-ل-مقاتلو-تنظيم-الدولة-في-تلغفر-جيبايعون-على-الموت>.

⁵ "Al-Julani Yaqif Samitan Wa Nukhbah `Anasirih Yu`linun "Bai'ah Al-Mawt" Fi Halb," *Step News Agency*, February 1, 2020, <https://stepagency-sy.net/2020/02/01/بائفيديو-الجولاني-يقف-صامتاً-ورنخبة-عن/>.

⁶ From Levant, "Bai'at Ahali Jabl Al-Zawiyah `Ala Al-Mawt Difa'an `An `Dinihim Wa `Irdihim Wa Li Sad A-Hajmah Al-Nusayriyah Al-Barbariyah," *YouTube*, February 4, 2020,

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GzckxBgOJWo>; Nidal Kaban, "Pledge of Death As Final ISIS Stronghold in Syria Falls," *InsideOver*, March 30, 2019, <https://www.insideover.com/war/pledge-of-death-as-final-isis-stronghold-in-syria-falls.html>.

⁷ Husam Al-Sisi, "Ba'd Taqaddum Al-Nizam Al-Suri Fi Tif Idlib... Al-Julani Bi 'Abah Hamra' Wast Muqatiliha Fi Bai'ah Al-Mawt," *Al-Diyar*, February 1, 2020, <https://www.eldyar.net/111906>.

⁸ *Rumiyah*, 1438H, 9, 43.

⁹ *Rumiyah*, 1438H, 4, 24-25.

¹⁰ *Rumiyah*, 1438H, 9, 43.

¹¹ *Rumiyah*, 1438H, 4, 24-25.

¹² Muhammad Abdul Salam Faraj, *Jihad: The Absent Obligation* (Birmingham: Maktabah al-Ansar, 2000), 64, <https://archive.org/details/learnislampdfenglishbooktheabsentobligation/mode/2up>; Salam was a leader of the early Egyptian Jihad Group, and his book was regarded as a jihadist manifesto by jihadist groups in the pre-Al-Qaeda period.

¹³ *Rumiyah*, 1438H, 4, 24-25.

¹⁴ Imad al-Din bin Kathir, *Al-Bidayah Wa Al-Nihayah* (Beirut: Bayt al-Afkar al-Dawliyah, 2004), 1, 164-177; Al-Tabari, *Tarikh Al-Umam Wa Al-Muluk* (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyah, 1987), 2, 115-125; Sa'id Hawwa, *Al-Asas Fi Al-Sunnah Wa Fiqhiha: Al-Sirah Al-Nabawiyah* (Cairo: Dar Al-Salam, 1989), 2, 750-782.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Muhammad Yusuf bin Muhammad Ilyas Al-Kandhlawi, *Hayah Al-Sahabah* (Beirut: Muassasah Ar-Risalah, 1999), 1, 295.

¹⁷ Muhammad Al-Bukhari, *Sahih Al-Bukhari*, 4163, <https://sunnah.com/bukhari/64>; Raghیب Al-Sirjani, "Bai'ah Al-Ridwan Wa Al-Durus Mustafadah Minha," *IslamStory.com*, April 17, 2010, https://islamstory.com/ar/artical/22/بيعة-الرضوان#_ftn1.

¹⁸ *The Qur'an*, 48:18.

¹⁹ Al-Tabari, *Jami Al-Bayan Fi Tafsir Al-Qur'an*, Surah Al-Fath, Verse 18, <https://www.altafsir.com/Tafasir.asp?tMadhNo=0&tTafsirNo=1&tSoraNo=48&tAyahNo=18&tDisplay=yes&UserProfile=0&LanguageId=1>.

²⁰ Al-Nawawi, *Sharh Al-Nawawi 'Ala Muslim* (Dar Al-Khair, 1996), 13, 6, https://islamweb.net/ar/library/index.php?page=bookcontents&ID=5627&bk_no=53&flag=1; Hafiz bin Muhammad Hakami, *Marwiyat Ghazwah Al-Hudaibiyah: Jam' Wa Takhrij Wa Dirasah* (Al-Madinah: Matabi' Al-Jami'ah Al-Islamiyah, 1406H), 142.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² PERGAS, *Moderation in Islam*, 299.

²³ See tafsir (commentary) of Surah Al-Fath, Verse 8, in Abu 'Abdullah Al-Qurtubi, *Al-Jami' Li Ahkam Al-Qur'an*; Nasir al-Din al-Baidawi, *Anwar Al-Tanzil Wa Asrar Al-Ta'wil*; Muhammad al-Shawkani, *Fath Al-Qadir*; Abu Muhammad al-Husayn al-Baghawi, *Ma'alim Al-Tanzil*; Al-Khazin, *Lubab Al-Ta'wil Fi Ma'ani Al-Tanzil*; Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i, *Al-Mizan Fi Tafsir Al-Qur'an*; Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti, *Al-Dur Al-Manthur Fi Al-Tafsir Bi Al-Ma'thur*,

<https://www.altafsir.com/Tafasir.asp?tMadhNo=0&tTafsirNo=0&tSoraNo=1&tAyahNo=1&tDisplay=no&LanguageId=1>. See also hadiths narrated by Muhammad Al-Bukhari, *Sahih Al-Bukhari*, 2958,

<https://sunnah.com/bukhari/56>; Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj al-Naysaburi, *Sahih Muslim*, 1856b,

<https://sunnah.com/muslim/33>; Ahmad al-Nasa'ii, *Sunan an-Nasa'ii*, 4158, <https://sunnah.com/nasai/39>;

Abu 'Isa Muhammad at-Tirmidhi, *Jami' at-Tirmidhi*, 1591, <https://sunnah.com/tirmidhi/21>.

²⁴ Muhammad Al-Bukhari, *Sahih Al-Bukhari*, 4167, <https://sunnah.com/bukhari/64>; Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj al-Naysaburi, *Sahih Muslim*, 1861, <https://sunnah.com/muslim/33>.

²⁵ Khalid 'Uthman Al-Sabt (1435H), "Tafsir Surah Al-Fath (Verses 2-18)," *KhaledAlSabt.com*, Rabi' Al-Awwal 29, <https://khaledalsabt.com/interpretations/2159/2--من-قوله-تعالى-انا-ارسلناك-شاهدا-ومبشرا-ونذيرا-الاية-8-الى-> قوله-تعالى-بل-كانوا-لا-يفقهون-الا-قليلا-الاية-15

²⁶ Al-Nawawi, *Sharh Al-Nawawi 'Ala Muslim*, 13, 6,

²⁷ Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj al-Naysaburi, *Sahih Muslim*, 1856a, <https://sunnah.com/muslim/33>.

²⁸ Abu 'Isa Muhammad at-Tirmidhi, *Jami' at-Tirmidhi*, 1594, ; Hafiz bin Muhammad Hakami, *Marwiyat Ghazwah Al-Hudaibiyah*, 142-143.

²⁹ See "Kitab Al-Jihad Wa Al-Siyar, Bab Al-Bai`ah Fi Al-Harb An La Yafirru," in Muhammad Al-Bukhari, *Sahih Al-Bukhari*.

³⁰ See "Kitab Al-Imarah, Bab Mubaya`ah Al-Jaysh `Ind Iradah Al-Qital Wa Bayan Bai`ah Al-Ridwan Taht Al-Shajarah," in Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj al-Naysaburi, *Sahih Muslim*.

³¹ See "Kitab Al-Bai`ah, Bab Al-Bai`ah `Ala An la Nafir," in Ahmad al-Nasa`ii, *Sunan an-Nasa`ii*.

³² See "Kitab Al-Siyar, Bab Fi Bai`atih An La Yafirru," in `Abd Allah ibn `Abd al-Rahman al-Darimi, *Sunan al-Darimi*.

³³ Ali Al-Nadwi, *Al-Sirah Al-Nabawiyah* (Jeddah: Dar al-Shuruq, 1989), 276.

³⁴ Saifur-Rahman Al-Mubarakfuri, *Ar-Raheequl Makhtum - The Sealed Nectar: Biography of the Noble Prophet* (Houston: Dar-us-Salam Publications, 1996), 342.

³⁵ Ibn Qudamah, *Al-Mughni*, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1984), 10, 368-387; John Kelsay, *Arguing the Just War in Islam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 101; Fred M. Donner, "The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War," *Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions*, eds, John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 51.

³⁶ Muhammad Haniff Hassan, "A Rebuttal of Al-Qaeda and IS' Theological Justification of Suicide Bombing," *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* Vol. 9, No. 7, July 2017, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CTTA-July-2017.pdf>.

Submissions and Subscriptions

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses

L launched in 2009, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA) is the journal of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR). Each issue of the journal carries articles with in-depth analysis of topical issues on terrorism and counter-terrorism, broadly structured around a common theme. CTTA brings perspectives from CT researchers and practitioners with a view to produce policy relevant analysis.

The International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research has entered into an electronic licensing relationship with EBSCO, the world's largest aggregator of full text journals and other sources. Full text issues of Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses can be found on EBSCOhost's International Security and Counter-Terrorism Reference Center collection.

CALL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA) welcomes contributions from researchers and practitioners in political violence and terrorism, security and other related fields. The CTTA is published quarterly and submission guidelines and other information are available at www.rsis.edu.sg/research/icpvtr/ctta. To pitch an idea for a particular issue, please write to us at ctta@ntu.edu.sg.


For inclusion in the CTTA mailing list, please send your full name, organisation and designation with the subject 'CTTA Subscription' to ctta@ntu.edu.sg.

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) is a professional graduate school of international affairs at the Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. RSIS' mission is to develop a community of scholars and policy analysts at the forefront of security studies and international affairs. Its core functions are research, graduate education and networking. It produces cutting-edge research on Asia Pacific Security, Multilateralism and Regionalism, Conflict Studies, Non-Traditional Security, International Political Economy, and Country and Region Studies. RSIS' activities are aimed at assisting policymakers to develop comprehensive approaches to strategic thinking on issues related to security and stability in the Asia Pacific. For more information about RSIS, please visit www.rsis.edu.sg.




The International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) is a specialist research centre within the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. ICPVTR conducts research and analysis, training and outreach programmes aimed at reducing the threat of politically motivated violence and mitigating its effects on the international system. The Centre seeks to integrate academic theory with field research, which is essential for a complete and comprehensive understanding of threats from politically-motivated groups. The Centre is staffed by academic specialists, counter-terrorism analysts and other research staff. The Centre is culturally and linguistically diverse, comprising of functional and regional analysts from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and North America as well as Islamic religious scholars. Please visit www.rsis.edu.sg/research/icpvtr/ for more information.


STAFF PUBLICATIONS




Extremist Islam
—Recognition and Response
in Southeast Asia
Kumar Ramakrishna
(Oxford, 2022)




Normalization of Violence
—Conceptual Analysis and
Reflections from Asia
Irm Haleem (ed)
(Routledge, 2019)




Terrorist Deradicalisation
in Global Contexts
—Success, Failure & Continuity
Rohan Gunaratna, Sabariah
Hussin (eds)
(Routledge, 2019)




**International Case
Studies of Terrorist
Rehabilitation**
Rohan Gunaratna,
Sabariah Hussin (eds)
(Routledge, 2019)




**Deradicalisation and Terrorist
Rehabilitation—A Framework
for Policy Making &
Implementation**
Rohan Gunaratna, Sabariah
Hussin (eds) (Routledge, 2019)



**Civil Disobedience in
Islam—
A Contemporary Debate**
Muhammad Haniff
Hassan (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2017)



**Handbook of Terrorism
in the Asia-Pacific**
Rohan Gunaratna and
Stefanie Kam (eds)
(Imperial College Press,
2016)



Resilience and Resolve
Jolene Jerard and Salim
Mohamed Nasir
(Imperial College Press,
2015)

Nanyang Technological University

Block S4, Level B4, 50 Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798

Tel: + 65 6790 6982 | Fax: +65 6794 0617 | www.rsis.edu.sg